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ARGUMENTS 
I. NOTWITHSTANDING THE STATE'S ASSERTIONS, TRIAL 
COUNSEL PREJUDICIALLY DENIED MR. PASCUAL OF 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY NOT ONLY FAILING TO 
OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF MR. PASCUAL'S CHRONIC 
DRUG USE BUT BY STIPULATING THAT MR. PASCUAL, 
A DRUG ABUSER, HAD WRONGFULLY REQUESTED A 
U.A. FROM: THE FATHER OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM. 
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The State argues that Mr. Pascual cannot prevail because any 
objection to evidence of defendant's drug use would have likely 
been futile and because trial counsel's failure to object was 
strategic. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 10-14. The record on 
appeal and applicable case law demonstrate otherwise. 
The matter is so well-settled that a person may be convicted 
criminally only for his or her acts and not for his or her general 
character. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 1|l5, 992 P. 2d 951. In 
fact, "[t]he rule limiting the admissibility of evidence of prior 
crimes, as presently stated in rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, has existed for almost a century in this state." Id. 
(string citation omitted). This fundamental principle is violated 
"if a conviction is based on an inference that conviction is 
justified because of the defendant's criminal character or 
propensity to commit bad acts." Id. Although the rule has been 
somewhat limited over the course of time, "the basic concepts 
1 
embodied in the rule limiting the use of prior crime evidence 
remain intact." Id. ; cf. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 
837 with State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997) . 
Prior to deciding whether evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
bad acts is admissible under Rule 404 (b), "the trial court must 
determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, 
noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets 
the requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this evidence meets 
the requirements of rule 403." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 
59, f 16, 6 P.3d 1120 (citing State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 1(21-22, 
29, 993 P.2d 837). "A trial court's admission of evidence under 
rule 404(b) is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard." 
State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, 1(15, 108 P.3d 730; State v. Bluff, 
2002 UT 66, 1(56, 52 P.3d 1210 (citing Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at 1fl8) . 
However, "admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be 
scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper exercise of 
that discretion." Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at ^18 (citation omitted 
and emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, the State wrongfully and needlessly 
elicited evidence of Mr. Pascual's chronic drug abuse by way of 
the following testimony: 
Prosecutor: Did you ask [Defendant] point 
obviously, you did. What was 
[Defendant's] response during this 
2 
interview when you asked him about his 
version of what happened between he and 
S.M. 
Officer Malan: His version of it was that he -- he made 
a very weak denial of it. He mentioned 
that back in the year 2 000 that he was a 
chronic drug user of methamphetamines, 
and there was times that he would do 
drugs all day and all night and then 
stay up, you know, two to three days in 
a row doing those drugs, and that he 
could not remember anything like that. 
And he indicated that if people are 
saying this is what he did, that he must 
have done it. 
* * * * 
Prosecutor: Did he ever -- Did he give you any 
examples or statements as to why he 
couldn't remember? 
Officer Malan: As far as drug use, he indicated that he 
could not remember because he may have 
been on drugs at the time, and wishes he 
could remember. 
Prosecutor: Did he ever give you any specifics about 
this happening to him on other occasions 
about not being able to remember what he 
had done? 
Officer Malan: Yes. He mentioned there was one other 
time in his past that he was at a party 
or partying, and he woke up and there 
was a fat girl lying next to him and he 
couldn't remember the events of that 
night. He indicated that he was doing 
drugs on that night too.1 
A true and correct copy of the transcript containing the 
testimony of Officer Malan is attached as Addendum C to the Brief of 
Appellant. 
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(R. 245:82-84). Defendant's trial counsel made no effort, 
whatsoever, to object. 
Adding insult to injury, both the State and Mr. Pascual's 
trial counsel, after the presentation of evidence, stipulated to 
the following: 
. . . rather than recalling the victim to testify, that 
she would --a question that she was asked about why --
what her testimony would be about why the Defendant had 
asked her to go wake up her father on the morning that 
this allegedly happened. And were she to come back on 
the stand to testify to you and explain that to you 
about what she knew and the circumstances of what 
transpired that morning, the answer would be because the 
Defendant needed or wanted her father to give him an 
U.A. sample because he was undergoing urinalysis testing 
at that time and one was required that morning. 
(R. 245:151-52). 
Contrary to the State's assertion, had trial counsel 
objected, the trial court, under the first part of the previously 
mentioned test of admissibility, would have abused its discretion 
had it admitted the evidence of Mr. Pascual's chronic drug abuse. 
Moreover, in direct contravention to the State's position, the 
evidence of Mr. Pascual's chronic drug abuse was anything by 
necessary to prove the complete story or as background information 
of the crime charged. See State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 
n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).2 
2This same analysis applies to the ineffective assistance 
committed by trial counsel in the course of stipulating that Mr. 
Pascual, as a chronic drug abuser, had wrongfully requested a U.A. 
4 
Evidence of the prior drug abuse, as well as the wrongfully 
requested U.A., does not satisfy the requirements of Utah Rule of 
Evidence 402.3 Evidence of Mr. Pascual's chronic drug abuse or 
the wrongfully requested U.A. was less than probative of any 
material fact to the crime charged. Other than a misconceived 
propensity to commit the crime, evidence of Mr. Pascual's prior 
drug abuse or the wrongfully requested U.A. did not tend to prove 
a material fact of the crime charged. 
Accordingly, had trial counsel objected, the trial court 
would have erred if it had concluded that the evidence of Mr. 
Pascual's prior drug abuse or the wrongfully requested U.A. met 
the requirements of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Shickles, 760 P. 2d 291 (Utah 
1995), stated: 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice and the like substantially 
outweighs the incremental probative value, a 
variety of matters must be considered, 
including the strength of the evidence as to 
from another person. 
3According to Rule 402, "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. 
"Other crime evidence is admissible if it 'tends to prove some fact 
that is material to the crime charged--other than the defendant's 
propensity to commit crime.'" State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at f56, 52 
P.3d 1210. 
S 
the commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the interval 
of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and the degree to which 
the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
Id. at 2 95-96 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 
565 (3d ed. 1984)); see also Utah R. Evid. 403.4 The manner in 
which the State presented evidence of Mr. Pascual's chronic drug 
abuse and the wrongfully requested U.A. substantially increased 
the likelihood that the jury would and did convict Mr. Pascual 
based on his criminal character or propensity to commit bad acts. 
Both common sense and the record on appeal demonstrate that the 
need for the evidence was extremely low, if not nonexistent, in 
the instant case. In short, the evidence of Mr. Pascual's prior 
drug abuse and the wrongfully requested U.A. was unnecessary to 
the State's case, especially when considered in light of the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury based solely on Mr. Pascual's criminal character or 
propensity to commit bad acts. Moreover, in light of the factual 
circumstances of the case and the evidence presented at trial, the 
evidence of Mr. Pascual's prior drug abuse or the wrongfully 
4Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
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requested U.A. was unnecessary to the defense utilized at trial. 
See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89-90 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 
U.S. 988, 103 S.Ct. 341 (1982); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306. 
B. No Conceivable Tactical Basis 
The State also argues that trial counsel's non-objection to 
the evidence of Mr. Pascual's chronic drug use was strategic. 
According to the State, trial counsel, by not objecting, "hoped 
that jurors would suppose that if defendant was so under the 
influence of drugs that . . . he could not have formed the 
requisite intent to commit the first degree felony offense." 
See Brief of Appellee, pp. 14-15. Again, both the record and the 
law demonstrate otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 states that " [v] oluntary 
intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless 
such intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which 
is an element of the offense. . . ." Likewise, it would not be a 
defense to a crime that a defendant is a drug addict. Cf. State 
v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 
S.Ct. 341 (1982) (citing State v. Shelton, 71 Wash.2d 838, 431 
P.2d 201 (1967)); see also R. 71, Jury Instruction No. 35A, 
stating "Voluntary drug intoxication shall not b ea defense to the 
charge of Attempted Sodomy Upon a Child unless such intoxication 
negates the existence of the intentional or knowing mental state 
f 
of that offense." (Capitalization of charged crime omitted). 
Consequently, there is no conceivable strategical basis for trial 
counsel's actions. 
€!• Harmful Error 
The State's assertion concerning harmless error is also 
ineffectual in the instant case. See Brief of Appellee, p. 15. 
According to Utah case law, harmless errors are ''errors which, 
although properly preserved below and presented on appeal, are 
sufficiently inconsequential that [the appellate court] 
conclude [s] there is no reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings." See State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). In other words, u[f]or an error to 
require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." State 
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); see also State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) . In light of the 
foregoing, the likelihood in the instant case of a different 
result is sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the 
verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Mr. Pascual respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand the 
8 
case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 
this Court's instructions as set forth in its opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of October, 2006. 
AR#©iJi &NWIGGINS, P.C. 
leys for£S»pellant 
» 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11) . 
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